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I. INTRODUCTION
In United States v. Corey,' Alvin Scott Corey was found guilty of possessing a
firearm as a felon. Although Corey's possession of a Smith and Wesson shotgun
violated Maine law,2 Corey was prosecuted in the United States District Court
under the federal statute 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) 3 and its penalty statute, § 924(e). 4
On appeal, Corey argued that one of the requirements for his conviction, proof of
the statute's jurisdictional element, had not been satisfied because that proof rested
on expert testimony based, in part, on hearsay.5 The First Circuit Court of Ap-
1. 207 F.3d 84 (lst Cir. 2000).
2. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 393 (Supp. 2002). Section 393 reads:
1. Possession prohibited. A person may not own, possess or have under that person's
control a firearm, unless that person has obtained a permit under this section, if that
person:
A- 1. Has been convicted of committing or found not criminally responsible by reason
of mental disease or defect of committing:
(1) A crime in this State that is punishable by imprisonment for a term of one year or
more;
(2) A crime under the laws of the United States that is punishable by imprisonment for
a term exceeding one year;
(3) A crime under the laws of any other state that, in accordance with the laws of that
jurisdiction, is punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year. This sub-
paragraph does not include a crime under the laws of another state that is classified by
the laws of that state as a misdemeanor and is punishable by a term of imprisonment
of 2 years or less;
(4) A crime under the laws of any other state that, in accordance with the laws of that
jurisdiction, does not come within subparagraph (3) but is elementally substantially
similar to a crime in this State that is punishable by a term of imprisonment for one
year or more; or
(5) A crime under the laws of the United States, this State or any other state or the
Passamaquoddy Tribe or Penobscot Nation in a proceeding in which the prosecuting
authority was required to plead and prove that the person committed the crime with
the use of:
(a) A firearm against a person; or
(b) Any other dangerous weapon.
Id.
3. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (Supp. 2000) provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person... who
has been convicted in any court of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one
year ... to... possess in or affecting commerce.. . any firearm or ammunition." Id.
4. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (Supp. 2000). Section 924(e)(1) reads:
In the case of a person who violates section 922(g) of this title and has three previous
convictions by any court referred to in section 922(g)(1) of this title for a violent
felony or a serious drug offense, or both, committed on occasions different from one
another, such person shall be fined not more than $25, 000 and imprisoned not less
than fifteen years, and, notwithstanding any other provision of law, the court shall not
suspend the sentence of, or grant a probationary sentence to, such person with respect
to the conviction under section 922(g).
Id.
5. United States v. Corey, 207 F.3d at 89.
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peals, in a split decision, affirmed Corey's conviction, finding ample precedent for
allowing expert testimony based in part on hearsay to prove that Corey's Smith
and Wesson traveled in interstate commerce, establishing federal jurisdiction over
its possession.6 The dissenting judge strongly objected to the lack of rigor with
which that evidence had been admitted by the trial court, and reviewed by the
majority on appeal. 7 Noting that Corey's shotgun could have been made at a Smith
and Wesson factory in Houlton, Maine and so might never have traveled in inter-
state commerce, the dissent argued that a higher standard of reliability and review
was particularly in order for evidence establishing federal jurisdiction. 8
This Note examines how a remarkably low standard for asserting federal ju-
risdiction over felon firearm possession evolved in the United States Supreme Court,
how that standard has been interpreted in the lower courts and challenged by re-
cent Supreme Court Commerce Clause jurisprudence, and how a fundamental un-
fairness inherent to that standard played out in Corey. Part II of this Note reviews
the direct line of cases that set a "minimal nexus" with commerce requirement for
federal regulation of felon gun possession, including the pivotal holding in
Scarborough v. United States.9 Part II also examines two waves of lower court
challenges to that minimal nexus standard, following the Supreme Court's inter-
pretation of related federal criminal statutes in United States v. Lopez10 and Jones
v. United States.11 Part III of this Note analyzes the majority decision in Corey
and the extended dissenting opinion. This part concludes that the rigorous judicial
scrutiny urged by the dissenting judge on behalf of Mr. Corey is understandable
given issues of fundamental fairness raised by § 922(g)(1)'s low jurisdictional
threshold. Part III will argue that § 922(g)(1)'s jurisdictional threshold is so easily
met and so difficult to challenge that the statute unfairly reaches almost every
firearm possession. This Part will also argue that the broad reach of § 922(g)(1) is
coupled today with prosecutorial powers and sentencing consequences not con-
templated when the statute was enacted by Congress and first interpreted by the
Supreme Court. This Note concludes with a prediction of how challenges to the
dangerously low jurisdictional standard of § 922(g)(1) may arise and may fare in
the future.
11. THE JURISDICTIONAL ELEMENT OF § 922(g)(1)
Like thousands of federal statutes regulating criminal behavior, § 9 2 2(g)(1)
bases its federal jurisdictional authority in Congress's power to regulate under the
Commerce Clause. 12 The jurisdictional element of a federal criminal statute is
included to ensure that what the defendant did was within the power of the United
States Congress to regulate. 13 The jurisdictional element of a statute differs from
6. Id. at 91.
7. Id. at 105.
8. Id. at 97-98.
9. 431 U.S. 563 (1977).
10. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
11. 529 U.S. 848 (2000).
12. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3, stating "Congress shall have the power to ... regulate
commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with Indian tribes."
13. Richard W. Smith, Note, Interpreting the Constitution From Inside the Jury Box: Affect-
ing Interstate Commerce as an Element of the Crime, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 615, 620 n.30
(1998).
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its substantive elements, which define the scope of the conduct that is prohibited.
Both jurisdictional and substantive elements must be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt. 14 Although jurisdictional elements involve issues of both fact and law,15
the jury decides whether the prosecution has established the required statutory
connection between interstate commerce and the defendant, or the jurisdictional
element of a crime. 16 In the felon firearm possession statute § 922(g)(1), the juris-
dictional language appears in the statutory requirement that a firearm possessed by
a felon be "in or affecting commerce." 17 However, defining exactly which fire-
arms possessed by felons were "in or affecting commerce" required two detailed
statutory analyses by the United States Supreme Court.
A. Setting the Standard
Federal regulation of felon firearm possession began in 1968, when the statu-
tory predecessor of § 922(g)(1), § 1202(a) of Title VII,18 was included as an amend-
ment to the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act. 19 Congressional inter-
est in regulating the flow of firearms into and within the country had grown after
1963, when an assassin killed President Kennedy using a mail-order military sur-
plus rifle.20 The Senate Judiciary Committee did not report out the bill until 1968,
after almost five years of findings, debate, amendment, and the strong opposition
of the National Rifle Association. 21 On May 23, 1968, the full Senate added §
1202(a) to the Act by voice vote without any of the hearings or committee consid-
eration that preceded the other amendments to the Act.22 Section 1202(a) forbade
14. id.
15. See, e.g., United States v. Parker, 73 F.3d 48, 52 (5th Cir. 1996) (finding harmless error
when a judge ruled as a matter of law on the interstate nexus element).
16. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510 (1995) (finding that the jury must decide
every element in a criminal prosecution).
17. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (Supp. 2000). The relevant text of the statute appears supra note 3.
18. At the time, § 1202(a) read:
(a) Any person who
(1) has been convicted by a court of the United States or of a State or any political
subdivision thereof of a felony or
(2) has been discharged from the Armed Forces under dishonorable conditions, or
(3) has been adjudged by a court of the United States of a State or any political subdi-
vision thereof of being mentally incompetent, or
(4) having been a citizen of the United States has renounced his citizenship, or
(5) being an alien is illegally or unlawfully in the United States, who receives, pos-
sesses, or transports in commerce or affecting commerce, after the date of enactment
of this Act, any firearm shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not
more than two years, or both.
18 U.S.C. App. § 1202(a) repealed by Pub. L. 99-308, § 104(b) (May 19, 1986). The question of
whether "receives" and "possesses" or only "transports" were modified by the phrase "in com-
merce or affecting commerce" was the subject of considerable parsing and debate when the
Court interpreted the statute in United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 339 (1971).
19. Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (1968).
20. See William J. Vizzard, The Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REv. 79, 80
(1999).
21. Id. at 83. The "political dynamics in the Judiciary Committee" changed to allow passage
following the 1968 assassinations of Senator Robert Kennedy and Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.
Id.
22. Id. at 84.
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felons and other categories of questionable individuals from receiving, possessing
or transporting firearms in or affecting commerce. It also "suffered from poor
drafting which would bedevil its enforcers and confound the courts."'23 In fact,
when deciding the first interpretive challenge to § 1202(a) in United States v. Bass,24
the Supreme Court noted that the statute was "a last-minute Senate amendment..
. hastily passed with little discussion, no hearings, and no report."'25 The Bass
Court also noted that "the legislative history [of § 1202(a)] hardly speaks with that
clarity of purpose which Congress supposedly furnishes courts." 26 Even the gov-
ernment in Bass, arguing for an expansive interpretation for § 1202(a), conceded
that the statute "is not a model of logic or clarity." 27
What was unclear in § 1202(a) was whether the jurisdictional requirement
that a firearm be "in or affecting commerce" applied to firearms possessed by
felons, or applied only to firearms transported or received by them. In prosecuting
Mr. Bass, the government had not attempted to show any connection between Bass's
firearm and commerce, and contended it was not required to do so because § 1202(a)
banned felon firearm possession of any kind.28 Bass maintained that without some
requirement of a link between his particular possession and interstate commerce,
Congress, in enacting the law, "had overstepped its constitutional powers under
the Commerce Clause."'29
The Bass Court chose to avoid the constitutional issue of Congressional over-
reaching, and instead, set about resolving ambiguity in the statute's language by
first examining the intent of Congress in enacting it.30 The government argued
that a connection between a felon's gun possession and commerce need not be
proved for each conviction under § 1202(a) because the connection had been gen-
erally established for all felon firearm possessions by congressional findings be-
fore the statute was enacted. 31 However, the Bass majority was wary of reading
the jurisdictional language of § 1202(a) so broadly: the sanctions imposed by the
statute were criminal and carried serious criminal penalties. 32 Furthermore, such
a broad interpretation of the statute's reach would represent a sizeable federal in-
cursion into an area of criminal law traditionally regulated by states.33 The Bass
23. Id. (citing United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971)). Senator Russell Long, who
proposed the amendment, stated on the Senate floor that the purpose of the amendment was to
address simple possession of firearms at the federal level for the first time. Id. Some thought
this new legislation that was "intended to significantly alter federal policy became law with
little analysis largely as a political favor to improve its author's image as tough on crime." Id.
24. 404 U.S. 336 (1971).
25. Id. at 344 (footnote omitted).
26. Id. at 346 (quoting Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 483 (1951)).
27. Id. at 347 (citation omitted).
28. Id. at 338.
29. Id. (citing United States v. Bass, 308 F. Supp. 1385 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)).
30. See id. at 339.
31. Id. at 338.
32. Id. at 339.
33. Id. "Because its sanctions are criminal, and because, under the Government's broader
reading, the statute would mark a major inroad into a domain traditionally left to the States, we
refuse to adopt the broad reading in the absence of a clearer direction from Congress." Id. The
majority position contradicted the holdings in five of six United States courts of appeals who
had addressed the issue of whether § 1202(a)'s jurisdictional element must be proved in indi-
vidual cases. Id. at 351-52 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing decisions in the Second, Fourth,
Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits).
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dissent vigorously maintained that a connection or-nexus with commerce need not
be proved in individual instances. 34 The Bass majority chose to interpret § 1202(a)
as requiring proof of a nexus between a particular gun's possession and commerce
for each conviction.
35
The question of how much or what kind of evidence might establish a particu-
lar firearm possession's nexus with commerce was not before the Bass Court. The
Bass majority speculated that standards for such evidence would be permissive,
"given the evils that prompted the statute and the basic legislative purpose of re-
stricting the firearm-related activity of convicted felons." 36 A concurring Justice
declined to join the majority in predicting "the quantum of evidence necessary to
establish... [a] prima facie case," preferring to wait for "a case properly present-
ing that question before deciding it."'37 Six years later, in 1977, the question was
properly presented to the Court in Scarborough v. United States.38
In Scarborough, the Court granted certiorari to decide whether fedeial juris-
diction over felon firearm possession under § 1202(a) "is sustainable merely upon
a showing that the possessed firearm has previously at any time however remote
travelled in interstate commerce." 39 The Fourth Circuit was satisfied with that
minimal showing, 40 but other circuits were split on whether the statute required a
34. Id. at 353 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun maintained that Congress, in the
findings section of Title VII, § 1201, clearly stated its intention to reach every possession of a
firearm by a felon; that all such possessions, interstate or intrastate, affected interstate com-
merce; and "that Congress did not conclude that intrastate possession was a matter of less con-
cern to it than interstate possession." Id. Justice Blackmun unsuccessfully urged the majority to
address the constitutionality of § 1202(a) under the Commerce Clause. Id. at 356.
35. Id. at 347. The majority identified two interpretive principles applied in its decision.
One was the principle of lenity, that requires ambiguity in criminal law to be resolved in favor of
the defendant. Lenity reflects two policies: first, that clear language and fair notice must be
given to the public about what behavior is and is not proscribed by law; and two, that "legisla-
tures, not courts should define criminal activity." Id. at 348. The second interpretive principle
requires that, unless clearly directed otherwise by Congress, courts will not read statutes in a
way that significantly alters the balance of state and federal power. Id. at 349. At the conclusion
of the opinion, the majority restated its "regard for the sensitive relation between federal and
state criminal jurisdiction." Id. at 351.
36. Id. The majority suggested the Government could meet its burden in a number of ways:
For example, a person "possesses ... in commerce or affecting commerce" if at the
time of the offense the gun was moving interstate or on an interstate facility, or if the
possession affects commerce. Significantly broader in reach, however, is the offense
of "receiv[ing] ... in commerce or affecting commerce," for we conclude that the
Government meets its burden here if it demonstrates that the firearm received has
previously traveled in interstate commerce. This is not the narrowest possible read-
ing of the statute ....
Id. at 350-5 1.
37. Id. at 351 (Brennan, J., concurring in part).
38. 431 U.S. 563 (1977).
39. Id. at 567 n.5. The petitioner, who had a felony conviction for narcotics possession with
intent to distribute, was found with four firearms in his bedroom by police officers executing a
search warrant for narcotics. All four firearms had traveled in interstate commerce but all had
done so before the petitioner's felony conviction. Id. at 564-65. At Mr. Scarborough's trial, the
judge rejected jury instructions which required the Government to prove a present nexus be-
tween Scarborough's guns and interstate commerce. The judge instead chose to instruct the jury
that, to meet its burden of proof, the prosecution must only show that the guns had previously
traveled in interstate commerce. Id. at 566 (citations omitted).
40. See United States v. Scarborough, 539 F.2d 331 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 429 U.S.
815 (1976), aff'd, 431 U.S. 563 (1977).
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felon's firearm possession to have a present connection with commerce. 4 1 In af-
firming the Fourth Circuit's decision, the Supreme Court revisited its decision in
Bass, noting that it had been a close call whether a federal prosecution under §
1202(a) required any proof of nexus at all. 4 2
The Scarborough Court, like the Court in Bass, looked for Congress's intent
in the findings preceding enactment of § 1202(a). 4 3 The Court concluded that
Congress intended to prohibit possession of firearms by dangerous persons, in-
cluding felons and political assassins, 4 4 and to "reach possessions broadly."'4 5 The
Court saw the jurisdictional language "in commerce and affecting commerce" as
an assertion by Congress of its broadest powers under the Commerce Clause. 4 6
The majority concluded that Congress was not particularly concerned with the
effect of felon gun possession "on commerce except as a means to insure...
constitutionality." 4 7 Therefore, the Court reasoned, there was "no basis for con-
tending that a weapon acquired after a [felony] conviction affects commerce dif-
ferently from one acquired before and retained."' 4 8 Although some nexus with
commerce was required for each conviction, the majority found "no indication
that Congress intended to require any more than the minimal nexus that the fire-
armhave been, at some time, in interstate commerce." 49
The majority in Scarborough was certain their reading of § 1202(a) was cor-
rect; there was "no question that Congress intended no more than a minimal nexus
requirement." 50 The Court's interpretation "captures the essence of Congress' in-
41. Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. at 567 n.4. The Sixth and Tenth Circuit Courts
agreed with the Fourth Circuit that proof a firearm traveled in commerce at any time in the past
was adequate to establish nexus for a possession offense. Id. The Second, Seventh, and Eighth
Circuits found that proof of any past interstate movement was sufficient to establish a receipt
offense, but that a concurrent nexus with commerce must occur for a possession offense. Id.
42. Id. at 577 (citing United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971)).
43. See id. at 570-74.
44. Id. at 571-73 (citing 114 CONG. REc. 13868-69, 14773-74, 16286 (1968)).
45. Id. at 577.
46. Id. at 571. The majority noted that Congress knew enough about Commerce Clause
legislation to distinguish limited regulation of activities "in commerce" from "' an assertion of
its full Commerce Clause power so as to cover all activity substantially affecting interstate com-
merce."' Id. (quoting United States v. Am. Bldg. Maint. Indus., 422 U.S. 271, 280 (1975)).
47. Id. at 575 n. 11. The Court found it important that Senator Long, in arguing for passage of
Title VII on the Senate floor stated:
[Miany of the items and transactions reached by the broad swath of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 were reached by virtue of the power of Congress to regulate matters
affecting commerce, not just to regulate interstate commerce itself.... Congress
simply [should find] that the possession of these weapons by the wrong kind of people
is either a burden on commerce or a threat that affects the free flow of commerce.
Id. at 572 (quoting 114 CONG. REc. 13868-69 (1968)).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 575 (footnote omitted).
50. Id. at 577. In response to the argument for a Bass-like application of lenity and caution in
the face of changes to the federal-state balance, the Court reasoned that those two principles
were needed only when Congressional intentions were uncertain:
Here, the intent of Congress is clear. We do not face the conflicting pull between the
text and the history that confronted us in Bass. In this case, the history is unambigu-
ous and the text consistent with it. Congress sought to reach possessions broadly,
with little concern for when the nexus with commerce occurred. Indeed, it was a
close question in Bass whether § 1202(a) even required proof of any nexus at all in
20041,
tent." 5 1 Under the minimal nexus standard, it would be enough for federal pros-
ecutors to assert federal jurisdiction by showing that a gun possessed by a felon in
one state was manufactured in a different state, and thus, at some point in time, had
traveled in interstate commerce. The eight-to-one Scarborough decision set the
threshold for bringing federal charges for felon firearm possession from that point
forward.
B. Challenges to the Jurisdictional Element
In deciding Scarborough, the Court did not decide whether, in enacting a felon
firearm statute with a broad jurisdictional reach and low jurisdictional threshold,
Congress had overstepped its constitutional authority under the Commerce Clause.52
Eighteen years after Scarborough, that possibility was suggested when a similar
federal firearm possession statute53 came under attack, in United States v. Lopez.54
In Lopez, the Supreme Court appeared to change course after decades of al-
lowing Congress broad power to regulate criminal behavior under the Commerce
Clause. 55 In a five-to-four decision, the Court held that the Gun-Free School Zones
Act was an improper exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause authority because
firearm possession in or near schools had no connection with commerce "or any
sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one might define those terms."'56
The Lopez majority found that, to be subject to federal jurisdiction under the Com-
merce Clause, a regulated criminal activity must have a "substantial relation to
interstate commerce. ' 57 A dissenting Justice cautioned that at least twenty-five
sections of the United States Criminal Code contained statutes with jurisdictional
elements requiring far less than a "substantial" nexus with commerce, and pre-
dicted the majority decision in Lopez would create considerable "legal uncertainty"
in areas "that, until this case, seemed reasonably well settled" law.58
The Lopez decision gave rise to predictions that firearms possession statutes
with minimal nexus requirements, like § 1202(a), now recodified as § 922(g)(1),
individual cases. The only reason we concluded it did was because it was not "plainly
and unmistakably" clear that it did not. But there is no question that Congress in-
tended no more than a minimal nexus requirement.
Id. (citation omitted).
51. Id.
52. Brent E. Newton, Felons, Firearms and Federalism: Reconsidering Scarborough in Light
of Lopez, 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 671, 677 n.36 (2001). Briefs submitted for both sides in
Scarborough agreed Congress had the authority under the Commerce Clause to penalize posses-
sion of a firearm by a felon if the firearm had ever traveled in interstate commerce-the issue in
dispute was whether the language in § 1202(a) could be interpreted as explicitly exercising that
authority. Id.
53. The Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (1990), amended by 18
U.S.C. § 922(q) (1997) prohibited "knowingly.. .possess[ing] a firearm at a place that the indi-
vidual knows or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone."
54. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
55. See Newton, supra note 52, at 671; Andrew Weis, Note, Commerce Clause in the Cross
Hairs: The Use of Lopez-Based Motions to Challenge the Constitutionality of Federal Criminal
Statutes, 48 STAN. L. REv. 1431, 1432 (1996).
56. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561 (footnote omitted).
57. Id. at 559 (citing Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1,
37 (1937)).
58. Id. at 630 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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might not withstand the newly articulated Commerce Clause jurisprudence of
Lopez.59 A wave of lower court challenges by defendants convicted under §
922(g)(1) followed. 60 Some defendants reasoned that Lopez had invalidated the
minimal nexus standard of Scarborough so that prosecutors now were required to
prove a substantial relationship, not a minimal nexus, between a felon's gun pos-
session and interstate commerce. 6 1 Others argued that firearm possessions by fel-
ons, like Mr. Lopez's firearm possession in or near a school, had no nexus whatso-
ever with any economic activity, and that § 922(g)(1) was therefore, facially un-
constitutional. 62
The Lopez opinion itself supplied lower courts with the answer to the facial
challenges. 63 The Lopez Court noted with approval the Bass Court's holding that
a nexus with commerce must be proved in each individual possession of a firearm
by a felon.64 The Lopez Court reasoned that the presence of a jurisdictional ele-
ment in the statute at issue in Bass protected defendants by limiting federal juris-
diction to only some offenses particularly linked to commerce, whereas the fire-
arm statute invalidated in Lopez "has no express jurisdictional element which might
limit its reach to a discrete set of firearm possessions that additionally have an
explicit connection with or effect on interstate commerce. '65 The presence of the
jurisdictional requirement in § 922(g)(1) was seen, in the lower courts, to immu-
nize the statute from further facial challenge. 66 By early 1996, the First Circuit
declared claims that § 922(g)(1) was facially unconstitutional, following Lopez,
"hopeless on ... law."'67
Circuit courts continued to rely on the holding in Scarborough when rejecting
"as applied" challenges to the minimal nexus standard of § 922(g)(1) following
Lopez.68 By "[riefusing to discard Scarborough, no circuit has accepted the argu-
ment that Scarborough's de minimis nexus should be heightened."'69 In fact Lopez,
without specifically mentioning Scarborough, suggested that when a "regulatory
59. See, e.g., Carlo D'Angelo, Note and Comment, The Impact of United States v. Lopez
Upon Selected Firearms Provisions of Title 18 U.S.C. Section 922, 8 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 571
(1996).
60. Antony Barone Kolenc, Note, Commerce Clause Challenges After United States v. Lopez,
50 FLA. L. REV. 867, 877-78 (1998) (identifying § 922(g)(1) as the most widely challenged of
federal firearms legislation following Lopez, both facially and as applied).
61. See, e.g., United States v. McAllister, 77 F.3d 387, 390 (11th Cir. 1996); United States v.
Kuban, 94 F.3d 971, 976 (5th Cir. 1996) (DeMoss, J., dissenting).
62. Kolenc, supra note 60, at 878 n.73 (listing leading cases in every circuit raising and
rejecting facial challenges to § 922(g)(1)).
63. Id.
64. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561-62 (1995).
65. id. at 562 (emphasis added).
66. See, e.g., United States v. Rawls, 85 F3d 240, 242 (5th Cir. 1996) (collecting cases from
every circuit that has considered the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) after Lopez).
67. United States v. Bennett, 75 F.3d 40, 48-49 (1st Cir. 1996).
68. Kolenc, supra note 60, at 879. "As applied challenges" to § 922(g)(1) argued, to no avail,
that the minimal nexus standard of Scarborough should be heightened; that a timing require-
ment for possession was required; or that a firearm was manufactured in the state of possession.
In one case, where a gun had been manufactured in the state of possession, a conviction was
reinstated by the court of appeals because some components of the defendant's ammunition had
been made in another state. Id. at 878-80 (footnotes omitted) (discussing United States v. Mosby,
60 F.3d 454 (8th Cir. 1995)).
69. Id. at 879.
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statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de minimis character of indi-
vidual instances arising under the statute is of no consequence. ' ' 70
Nevertheless, circuit court judges, in dissenting and concurring opinions, ques-
tioned whether the minimal nexus standard of § 922(g)(1) was not somehow fore-
closed by the Lopez requirement of "substantial relation" with commerce. The
Fifth Circuit decision in United States v. Rawls71 was one example. After reject-
ing Rawls's facial argument that § 922(g)(1) exceeds Congress's authority under
the Commerce Clause, 72 the Fifth Circuit turned to his "as applied" argument that
his possession "had no connection to channels or instrumentalities of interstate
commerce."'73 Citing Scarborough, the court concluded that because Mr. Rawls's
gun was manufactured in Massachusetts and possessed in Texas, the minimal nexus
standard had been met.74 However, in a concurring opinion joined by the other
judges, Judge Garwood observed that if § 922(g)(1) were newly enacted, "one
might well wonder how it could rationally be concluded that mere possession of a
firearm in any meaningful way concerns interstate commerce simply because the
firearm had, perhaps decades previously before the charged possessor was even
born, fortuitously traveled in interstate commerce. '75 Judge Garwood wondered
"how a statute construed never to require any but such a per se nexus could 'en-
sure, through case-by-case inquiry, that the firearm possession in question affects
interstate commerce.' 76 The judge then proceeded to defer to Scarborough and
affirm Rawls's conviction because "[iut is not for us to say that following what
seems to be implicit in Scarborough is to proceed ... down the road closed by
Lopez."7
7
C. Further Challenges
A second wave of challenges to the minimal nexus standard of § 922(g)(1)
followed in 2000, with the Supreme Court's unanimous decision in Jones v. United
States.78 Seven days before deciding Jones, the Court reiterated and strengthened
the "substantial relation" to commerce requirement of Lopez by invalidating a fed-
70. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Maryland v. Wirtz,
392 U.S. 183, 197 (1968)).
71. 85 F3d 240 (5th Cir. 1996).
72. Id. at 242. The Rawls Court stated that "[clentral to the Court's holding in Lopez was the
fact that [the firearm statute at issue] contained 'no jurisdictional element which would ensure,
through a case-by-case inquiry, that the firearm possession in question affects interstate com-
merce."' Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 242-43.
75. Id. at 243 (Garwood, J., concurring).
76. Id. (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995)).
77. Id. Judge Garwood observed:
[Tlhe opinion in Scarborough v. United States ... requires us to affirm denial of relief
here. While Scarborough addresses only questions of statutory construction, and does
not expressly purport to resolve any constitutional issue, the language of the opinion
and the affirmance of the conviction there carry a strong enough implication of con-
stitutionality to now bind us, as an inferior court, on that issue in this essentially
indistinguishable case ....
Id. (citations omitted).
78. 529 U.S. 848 (2000).
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eral criminal statute79 because of its remote connection to economic activity. In
United States v. Morrison,80 the Court reaffirmed that Congress's regulatory au-
thority under the Commerce Clause did not extend to criminal conduct that was
not economic in nature.8 1 In spite of considerable Congressional findings on the
cumulative economic effects of the regulated criminal activities, 82 the Court re-
jected the argument that Congress established a sufficient nexus to commerce in
the aggregated cost to national productivity of individual, noneconomic crimes,83
reminding Congress that a similar aggregated and "attenuated" connection to com-
merce was rejected in Lopez. 84 The Court warned that, under such aggregation, no
conduct or object falls outside Congress's jurisdictional reach. 85 The Morrison
Court also confirmed its preference for federal criminal statutes with express juris-
dictional elements; 86 that such elements "lend support to the argument that... [the
statute at issue] is sufficiently tied to interstate commerce. ' 87 Unless the reach of
federal criminal regulation under the Commerce Clause was limited by these ex-
press jurisdictional requirements, a concurring Justice warned, "we will continue
to see Congress appropriating state police powers under the guise of regulating
commerce."
88
A week later, the Court reversed and remanded Dewey Jones's arson convic-
tion under a federal statute that included just such an express jurisdictional ele-
ment.8 9 Finding that the house Jones destroyed was neither "used in" nor "affect-
ing" commerce, the Court concluded its destruction was therefore "not subject to
federal prosecution." 90 In limiting the jurisdictional reach of the arson statute, the
79. 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (2000) was part of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994, § 40302,
108 Stat. 1941-1942 (1994). The section authorized a civil remedy for criminal acts of violence
motivated by gender. Id.
80. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
81. Id. at 610 (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551(1995)).
82. Id. at 614. "As we stated in Lopez, '[S]imply because Congress may conclude that a
particular activity substantially affects interstate commerce does not necessarily make it so."'
Id. (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557, n.2) (citation omitted).
83. Id. at 617. The Court stated: "We accordingly reject the argument that Congress may
regulate noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based solely on that conduct's aggregate effect
on interstate commerce. The Constitution requires a distinction between what is truly national
and what is truly local." Id. at 617-18 (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 568 (citations
omitted)).
84. Id. at 615.
85. Id. The Court stated:
In these cases, Congress' findings are substantially weakened by the fact that they
rely so heavily on a method of reasoning that we have already rejected as unworkable.
... If accepted, petitioners' reasoning would allow Congress to regulate any crime as
long as the nationwide, aggregated impact of that crime has substantial effects on
employment, production, transit, or consumption.
Id.
86. Id. at 613.
87. Id. The Court stated a jurisdictional element would "establish[] that the federal cause of
action is in pursuance of Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce." Id.
88. Id. at 627 (Thomas, J., concurring).
89. Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 853, 859 (2000) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) (1994)).
The jurisdictional language in § 844(i) required that a building or property destroyed or dam-
aged by fire or explosion be "used in interstate or foreign commerce or in any activity affecting
interstate or foreign commerce." 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) (1994).
90. Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. at 850-51.
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Jones Court appeared to suggest that statutes like § 922(g)(1) containing express
jurisdictional elements were vulnerable to "as applied" challenges if the nexus
between a particular criminal activity and commerce seemed attenuated or absurd.
Avoiding constitutional questions, the Jones Court interpreted the arson statute as
"not soundly read to make virtually every arson in the country a federal offense." 9 1
Judges were expressly advised by the Jones Court to examine the language of
statutes for words limiting the jurisdictional reach of a statute, especially, the Court
warned, "when the words describe an element of a criminal offense."'92
The Jones Court worried about, but declined to decide, whether the arson
statute in question intruded upon "traditionally local criminal conduct" by making
it "a matter for federal enforcement."'93 This same concern about the intrusion of
federal regulations into state prerogatives was raised, but also not decided, in Bass
and Lopez. As in Bass and Lopez, the Jones Court followed the interpretive rule
that "constitutionally doubtful constructions should be avoided" 94 and restricted
its inquiry to how the federal arson statute applied to the particular building de-
stroyed by Mr. Jones. Nonetheless, Justice Stevens acknowledged an important
danger inherent in "federal pre-emption of state law."9 5 Jones had received a thirty-
five year sentence under the federal arson statute, when the same state offense
carried a maximum penalty of ten years, demonstrating, Justice Stevens noted,
"how a [federal] criminal law... may effectively displace a policy choice made by
the State."'96
A second wave of lower court challenges to § 922(g)(1) convictions followed
the Morrison and Jones decisions. 97 Facial attacks were rejected in the lower
courts, as they had been following Lopez, by citing the presence in § 922(g)(1) of
an express jurisdictional element not found in the statutes at issue in Lopez or
Morrison.98 However, defendants now argued that broadly drafted jurisdictional
language, such as § 922(g)(1)'s, could be narrowly interpreted, and even invali-
dated, in the wake of Jones.99 Some judges argued that the minimal nexus stan-
91. Id. at 859. The Court warned elsewhere in the opinion:
Were we to adopt the Government's expansive interpretation of § 844(i), hardly a
building in the land would fall outside the federal statute's domain. Practically every
building in our cities, towns, and rural areas is constructed with supplies that have
moved in interstate commerce, served by utilities that have an interstate commerce
connection, financed or insured by enterprises that do business across state lines, or
bears some other trace of interstate commerce.
Id. at 857.
92. Id. (quoting Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 140-41 (1994)).
93. Id. at 858 (citing United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 350 (1971)).
94. Id. at 851. The Court applied both interpretive doctrines used to resolve the statutory
ambiguity in Bass: the doctrine of lenity and of constitutional doubt. See supra text accompany-
ing note 35, and Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. at 857-59.
95. Id. at 859 (Stevens, J., concurring).
96. Id.
97. See George D. Brown, Constitutionalizing the Federal Criminal Law Debate: Morrison,
Jones, and the ABA, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 983 (2001) (examining the surprisingly small effect of
the Morrison and Jones decisions on decisions in the lower courts).
98. See, e.g., United States v. Santiago, 238 F.3d 213, 216 (2d Cir. 2001) (finding that the
jurisdictional element in § 922(g)(1) limited its "'reach to a discrete set of firearm possessions,
as required by Lopez).
99. See Newton, supra note 52, at n.48 (citing United States v. Daugherty, 264 F.3d 513 (5th
Cir. 2001); United States v. Santiago, 238 F.3d at 216).
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dard of § 922(g)(l), set in Scarborough in 1977, improperly federalized felon gun
possession on the slightest pretext of past interstate movement. In United States v.
Coward,100 District Judge Dalzell referred to the minimal nexus standard of
Scarborough as a legal fiction, stating:
Scarborough may fairly be read to establish the legal fiction that has prevailed in
these cases since it was announced .. . Simply phrased, Scarborough's legal
fiction is that the transport of a weapon in interstate commerce, however remote
in the distant past, gives its present intrastate possession sufficient interstate as-
pect to fall within the ambit of the statute. This fiction is indelible and lasts as
long as the gun can shoot. Thus, a felon who has always kept his father's World
War II trophy Luger in his bedroom has the weapon "in" commerce. The ques-
tion now is whether this legal fiction can survive as a statutory construct in the
shadow of the edifice the Supreme Court has built upon Lopez's foundation. 10 1
Nonetheless, while lower courts observed that Lopez, Morrison, and Jones
cast doubt on the validity of the minimal nexus standard of § 922(g)(1), they were
unable to ignore the direct application and unambiguous language interpreting that
standard in Scarborough.10 2 After concluding that a defendant's gun "was neither
'used in commerce' nor did it have any present or imminent interstate aspect" and
that "[h]is conviction therefore should not stand, as he committed no federal
crime," 103 the Coward court nonetheless upheld Mr. Coward's conviction under §
922(g)(1) because "we must respect ... Scarborough,"104 and must leave to the
Supreme Court "the prerogative of overruling its own decisions." 105 Every lower
court faced with a challenge to federal jurisdiction under the minimal nexus stan-
dard of § 922(g)(1) concluded that their hands were tied as long as "the Supreme
Court's analysis... in Scarborough remains good law."106
Il1. UNITED STATES V. COREY
In 1997, an Easterfield 916-A, Smith and Wesson 12-gauge pump shotgun
was seized from the Maine home of convicted felon Alvin Scott Corey by officers
of the sheriff's department. 10 7 Corey was convicted of possessing a firearm that
had traveled in interstate commerce under the federal statute 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)
and its penalty statute § 924(e). 10 8 At Corey's trial in the United States District
Court, 10 9 a single firearms enforcement officer from the Bureau of Alcohol, To-
bacco and Firearms (ATF) provided evidence that Mr. Corey's shotgun traveled in
interstate commerce. 110 The agent testified, as an expert, that Corey possessed
100. 151 F. Supp. 2d 544 (E.D. Pa. 2001).
101. Id. at 549.
102. See United States v. Torres, 149 F. Supp. 2d 199, 201-02 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (collecting
cases from circuits upholding the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) and the Supreme Court's analysis
of its nexus standard in Scarborough).
103. United States v. Coward, 151 F. Supp. 2d at 554-55.
104. Id. at 555.
105. Id. (quoting Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989)).
106. United States v. Nelson, No. 00-06-P-C, 2001 WL 883640, at *2 (D. Me. Aug. 3,2001).
107. United States v. Corey, 207 F.3d 84, 85 (1st Cir. 2000).
108. Id. See supra notes 3-4.
109. Corey was convicted in a jury trial in the United States District Court for the District of
Maine, Hon. Morton A. Brody presiding. 207 F.3d at 84.
110. Id. at 85.
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[while in Maine] a shotgun manufactured in Springfield, Massachusetts. 111
Corey objected to the agent's qualifications as an expert and to the agent's
reliance on hearsay as a basis for his conclusion that Corey's gun was made in
Massachusetts. 112 On voir dire, the agent attested to his experience and qualifica-
tions as an expert in matters relating to firearm manufacture. 113 The agent ac-
knowledged that Smith and Wesson had manufacturing facilities in Houlton, Maine,
the state of possession, as well as in Ohio and Massachusetts. 114 The agent said he
based his conclusions about Corey's gun on in-house ATF files containing infor-
mation provided to ATF by gun manufacturers and historians. 115 Corey renewed
his objection to the agent's testimony, claiming it relied on hearsay, and demanded
that the government cure the problem by producing "business records from these
[firearm] factories."116 The government successfully argued that the Federal Rules
of Evidence allowed experts "to formulate an opinion based on facts of a type
reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field." 117
On direct examination, the agent testified that he had concluded Corey's gun
was not made in Maine after a telephone conversation with Smith and Wesson
historian Roy Jinks. 118 During cross-examination, the agent added that he also
relied on in-house ATF files and an ATF library, as well. 119 Corey was found
guilty of being a felon in possession of a firearm that had traveled in interstate
commerce under § 922(g)(1). 120
On appeal, Corey sought to set aside his conviction on the grounds that the
district court abused its discretion when it admitted evidence from the ATF agent
to show that Corey's shotgun had traveled in interstate commerce. 121 The First
Circuit, in a two-to-one decision, found that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in allowing a single ATF expert to present testimony based partly on
hearsay and partly on ATF's own records to prove interstate nexus, the jurisdic-
tional element of Corey's offense. 122 Arguing from precedent, the majority cited a
line of cases from several circuits in which the nexus element of § 922(g)(1) was
established by relying on equivalent evidence or less.123 After examining the lan-
guage of Federal Rules of Evidence 702124 and 703,125 the majority also found
111. Id. at 86.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 86-87.
117. Id. at 87. The government cited Federal Rules of Evidence 702 and 703. See infra notes
124-25.
118. United States v. Corey, 207 F.3d at 87.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 85.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 92. The abuse of discretion standard for appellate review of evidentiary rulings
originated in 1879, in the Supreme Court's decision in Spring Co. v. Edgar, 99 U.S. 645, 658
(1879). For a discussion of the standard's history see General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S.
136, 141-42 (1997).
123. United States v. Corey, 207 F.3d at 88.
124. Rule 702. Testimony by Experts
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an
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that the agent's expert opinion was based on information reasonably relied upon
by experts and conformed to the plain meaning of the evidence rules, 126
The majority declined to apply a less deferential standard of review to the
evidentiary decisions of the district court, choosing instead to construe the issue
on appeal as only whether the trial court abused its discretion when admitting the
ATF agent's evidence. 127 The majority held that the standard of review for lower
court rulings on evidence proving the jurisdictional element of § 922(g)(1) was
"highly deferential" 128 and that such rulings were "reversed only if 'manifestly
erroneous."' 129 The majority also declined to consider arguments not raised in
Corey's clearly inadequate appellant's brief.130 The court identified two argu-
ments that might have shown promise for the defendant had they been raised:
first, that the expert testimony based on hearsay was insufficient proof of the juris-
dictional element of Corey's offense, and second, that Corey's constitutional pro-
tections were violated. 131 The majority declined to consider whether one agent's
testimony, based partly on hearsay, sufficiently established the element of §
922(g)(1) conferring federal jurisdiction. 132 Instead, the court noted that the jury
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in
the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts
or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the
witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.
Fed. R. Evid. 702.
125. Rule 703. Bases of Opinion Testimony by Experts.
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or
inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the
hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in form-
ing opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in
evidence in order for the opinion or inference to be admitted. Facts or data that are
otherwise inadmissible shall not be disclosed to the jury by the proponent of the opin-
ion or inference unless the court determines that their probative value in assisting the
jury to evaluate the expert's opinion substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect.
Fed. R. Evid. 703.
126. United States v. Corey, 207 F.3d at 88-90.
127. Id. at 88. The majority stated: "we ... will not reverse [the ruling on admissibility]
unless the ruling at issue was predicated on an incorrect legal standard or we reach a 'definite
and firm conviction that the court made a clear error of judgment."' Id. (quoting United States
v. Shay, 57 F.3d 126, 132 (1st Cir. 1995)).
128. Id. at 88 (quoting United States v. Gresham, 118 F.3d 258, 266 (5th Cir. 1997)).
129. Id. (quoting United States v. Ware, 914 F.2d 997, 1002 (7th Cir. 1990)).
130. See id. at 88 n.3. The majority remarked that "the entire legal argumentation in appellant's
fifteen-page brief consists of less than two pages, in which he neither cites Evidence Rule 702 or
703, nor articulates any Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause claim." Id.
131. See id. at 92. The constitutional issue raised by the dissent was whether hearsay testi-
mony by the ATF agent violated Corey's protection under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment. In declining to address potentially promising issues not raised by Corey on ap-
peal, the majority said:
[W]e need not consider whether the [agent's] testimony would have been admissible
under Rule 703 had he relied exclusively on the telephone conversation to Smith and
Wesson employees. Moreover, given the categorical formulation of the argument
presented by Corey on appeal, there is no need to determine whether [the agent's]
partial reliance on the telephone conversation.., somehow rendered his otherwise
well-supported expert opinion suspect under either the Federal Rules of Evidence or
the Confrontation Clause.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
132. See id.
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which convicted Corey, "[o]bviously. . . remained free to discredit" the interstate
nexus evidence and affirmed Corey's conviction. 13 3
Chief Judge Torruella, in a lengthy dissent, argued strongly for judicial activ-
ism on behalf of the defendant, including on issues the majority said were "not
properly before us." 134 Judge Torruella first urged that a more rigorous standard
of review was in order for expert evidence of a jurisdictional element, whether or
not it was strictly necessary or was called for in the defendant's appellant brief. 135
Judge Torruella urged the court to thoroughly review admission of the government's
interstate nexus evidence when the "evidence was used to establish a jurisdictional
fact absent which there is no triable federal crime."' 136 Second, he argued that the
majority's deference was particularly inappropriate when there was an actual pos-
sibility that Corey's gun was made in Maine. 137 Third, Judge Torruella found the
majority's deference to an ATF agent's testimony wrong as a matter of policy when
direct evidence could establish the jurisdictional element with "relatively little ef-
fort on the part of the prosecution" 138 and when the basis for the evidence was
expedient and "self-serving." 139 Judge Torruella urged that such deference to the
prosecution in admitting hearsay evidence violated Corey's constitutional protec-
tions under the Confrontation Clause. 140
Judge Torruella first noted that Corey's appeal did not present "a pure eviden-
tiary question" subject to an abuse of discretion standard of review. 14 1 The judge
argued that when evidentiary questions raise issues of fact and law, or are so inter-
twined with substantive law, a much less deferential standard of review is appro-
priate. 142 Allowing expert testimony by a single government agent based on the
agency's own files and the agent's phone conversations to establish federal juris-
diction under § 922(g)(1) was just such an evidentiary issue, and was subject to a
higher standard of review. 143 "Here, [the agent] was the sole source of the
prosecution's evidence on interstate nexus, and the question ... is whether...
admitting this testimony was proper as a matter of law."144
Judge Torruella next noted that the question of whether expert testimony may
be used to establish interstate nexus under § 922(g)(1) was a matter of first impres-
sion in the First Circuit. The judge acknowledged that other circuits had found
133. Id.
134. Id. at 88 n.3.
135. Id. at 105 (Torruella, J., dissenting).
136. Id. at 93.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 92. U.S. CONST. amend. VI states, in pertinent part: "[Tihe accused shall enjoy the
right... to be confronted with the witnesses against him."
141. United States v. Corey, 207 F.3d at 94 (Torruella, J., dissenting).
142. Id. (citing Salas v. Carpenter, 980 F.2d 299, 305 (5th Cir. 1992)).
143. Id. at 95. Judge Torruella reminded the majority that "'experts, not only explain evi-
dence, but are themselves sources of evidence."' Id. at 94 (quoting In re Air Crash Disaster at
New Orleans, 795 F.2d 1230, 1233 (5th Cir. 1986)). Because a judge deciding admissibility
where the expert is a source of evidence draws less on the immediate facts of the case, and more
on substantive law, Judge Torruella argued, agreeing with the Fifth Circuit, that such admissibil-
ity rulings on appeal are issues of fact and law, and should require "'a much closer look."' Id.
(quoting In re Air Crash Disaster at New Orleans, 795 F.2d 1230, 1233 (5th Cir. 1986)).
144. Id. at 95.
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expert testimony proving nexus under § 922(g)(1) to be permissible. 145 However,
Judge Torruella found most of these cases distinguishable on the facts because, in
most, there was no possibility whatsoever that the gun in question had been manu-
factured in the state of possession. 146 He found holdings in other cases to be
"contrary to the dictates of Rules 702 and 703." 147 The judge disagreed that the
court need not consider the sufficiency of the prosecution's nexus evidence, as
well as its admissibility, 14 8 maintaining that courts allow firearms experts to rely
on personal knowledge "only where based on the brand it was a physical impossi-
bility that the weapon was manufactured in the state of possession." 149 Judge
Torruella argued it was not reasonable to rely solely on a single law enforcement
officer's hearsay evidence to establish so crucial an element of the crime when that
element was susceptible to doubt. 150 "Here, Smith & Wesson has a manufacturing
plant in Maine, the state of possession. Under these circumstances, it is axiomatic
that a higher degree of proof should be required to opine that appellant's ... fire-
arm was not manufactured ... in Maine." 151
Judge Torruella finally warned that the majority had set a dangerous prece-
dent by its "reflexive deference to the ATF," allowing the Bureau to rely on "its
own hearsay compilation as a basis for expert opinion."'152 The judge questioned
the reliability of information neither published nor subject to peer review, and
relied upon "by an investigating officer after criminal proceedings ha[d] begun,"
especially when objective information of interstate nexus was available. 153 The
judge found it "difficult to imagine that in any other context the Court would allow
an agent of one party to rely on that party's own self-serving, internal documents
as a basis for his so-called expert opinion." 154 The judge deplored permitting "a
government agency to rely on its own internal manuals and post-indictment tele-
phone calls to establish a basic element of a crime."' 155 Judge Torruella concluded
by noting that producing "non-hearsay evidence on the jurisdictional requirement
of § 922(g)(1) is hardly a major burden on the prosecution .... [I]t is a minor
bureaucratic inconvenience .... The resources of the government can hardly be
strained by requiring such direct proof of interstate nexus."
156
145. Id. (citing cases in the Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Cir-
cuits).
146. Id. at 101.
147. Id. at 95.
148. Id. at 100-01.
149. Id. at 101.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 103.
153. Id. at 100. Such objective evidence, Judge Torruella suggested, might include trace
reports which are filled out and returned by gun manufacturers stating where a particular gun
was made; markings on some weapons indicating the place of manufacture, and business records
or testimony supplied by firearms manufacturers themselves. Id. at 102-03. Providing such
direct evidence would, Judge Torruella argued, be more consistent with the protections guaran-
teed to Mr. Corey by the Confrontation Clause. Id. at 104.
154. Id. at 100. Judge Torruella reiterated "I do not believe that a law enforcement officer
may reasonably rely on hearsay evidence to establish an element of a crime simply because he is
deemed an expert witness." Id. at 101.
155. Id. at 105.
156. Id.
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IV. ANALYSIS
The passion and persistence of Judge Torruella's activist argument on behalf
of Mr. Corey makes sense given the advantage to the prosecution of the minimal
nexus standard of § 922(g)(1) and the limited avenues available to the defense for
challenging that standard. This imbalance may be attributed first, to the standard's
history, which set the low minimal nexus standard and foreclosed most challenges
to it, and second, to the consequences to individual defendants of federal jurisdic-
tion over their criminal offense. Although the Corey majority stuck closely to its
deferential standard of review and narrow identification of the issues on appeal,
Judge Torruella's argument expressed both stated and unstated concern for the
ease with which the prosecution established federal jurisdiction over Mr. Corey's
offense and the consequences to Mr. Corey of that jurisdiction.
A. The Broad Jurisdictional Reach of§ 922(g)(1)
Judge Torruella was correctly concerned with the majority's reflexive defer-
ence to the prosecution under the facts in Corey, when the firearm in question
might have been made in the state of possession, freeing its possession from even
a minimal nexus with commerce. "Here, Smith & Wesson has a manufacturing
plant in Maine .... Under these circumstances, it is axiomatic that a higher degree
of proof should be required ....- 157 Judge Torruella urged a higher degree of
evidentiary rigor from prosecutors and review from appellate courts for the rare
case when a firearm possession might escape the "Scarborough fiction"--that cross-
ing any state line at any time places a felon's firearm "in commerce" for purposes
of a federal crime. 158 Because § 922(g)(1)'s jurisdictional threshold presents al-
most no barrier to prosecutors bringing federal charges, Judge Torruella was deter-
mined to use the interpretive latitude of the Federal Rules of Evidence and stan-
dards of appellate review to hold the prosecution to its proof in Mr. Corey's case. 159
In fact, Mr. Corey was pursuing the only avenue available to him for success-
fully challenging the jurisdictional reach of § 922(g)(1): challenging the suffi-
ciency and admissibility of prosecution nexus evidence when interstate nexus was
open to doubt. The First Circuit was not free to decide on Mr. Corey's behalf that
the minimal nexus of § 922(g)(1) reached too broadly, or failed to require a "sub-
stantial effect" on commerce, making it constitutionally questionable after Lopez,
as long as Scarborough applied directly and remained good law. 160 Judge Torruella
conceded that the minimal nexus standard set in Scarborough was "well settled." 161
However, the First Circuit was free to consider Corey's challenge to the quality
and quantity of the prosecution's nexus evidence. Judge Torruella repeatedly dis-
tinguished the Corey fact pattern from those of most defendants prosecuted under
§ 922(g)(1), emphasizing that Mr. Corey's potentially successful challenge to the
157. Id. at 101.
158. See id.
159. See id.
160. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989), where the
Supreme Court expressly directed courts of appeals to follow the precedent that directly applies
to their cases, even when the Supreme Court appears to suggest, as it did in Lopez, that it was
rejecting the reasoning used to establish that precedent. Id. at 484. The Court instructed courts
of appeals to leave to the Supreme Court "the prerogative of overruling its own decisions." Id.
161. United States v. Corey, 207 F.3d at 93.
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minimal nexus with commerce was "rare" and "exceptional. '162 Just how rarely
felon firearm possession falls outside the scope of federal jurisdiction under §
92 2(g)(1) is startling and raises important questions about its fairness.
In theory, the benefit of including a jurisdictional element in a federal firearms
statute, according to the Lopez Court, lies in that element's limitation of federal
prosecutions to offenses involving "a discrete set of firearm possessions that...
have an explicit connection with or effect on interstate commerce." 163 The juris-
dictional element "ensure[s], through case-by-case inquiry, that the firearm pos-
session in question affects interstate commerce." 164 In fact, experts on firearms
manufacture estimate that the vast majority, perhaps ninety-five percent, of fire-
arms in the United States, or their ammunition, or component parts, have, at some
time, crossed a state line, meeting § 922(g)(1)'s minimal nexus standard. 16 5 In
spite of the Supreme Court's reliance on the presence of a jurisdictional element to
distinguish federal from non-federal offenses, the set of firearms possessions
criminalized under § 922(g)(1) could hardly be called discrete. 166
Because the jurisdictional scope of § 922(g)(1) typically reaches almost every
firearm possession, 167 Judge Torruella correctly insisted that minimal nexus be
proved by direct and unambiguous evidence once it was susceptible to reasonable
doubt. 168 In a true case-by-case inquiry, the judge argued, even so minimal a
nexus should not be established by minimally reliable evidence from "federal law
enforcement officers testifying regarding a self-serving subject matter."16 9 Judge
Torruella rejected the majority argument that Rule 703 relaxes "best evidence"
requirements for reasons of efficiency, noting that providing direct, trustworthy
evidence was "hardly a major burden" for the prosecution, especially when meet-
ing the minimal nexus standard of § 922(g)(1) typically presented the prosecution
with almost no burden at all. 170
162. Id. at 101-03.
163. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 562 (1995).
164. Id. at 561.
165. See, e.g., Newton, supra note 52 at 684 nn.52-53. Special Agent George Michael Tay-
lor, a thirty-year veteran of the ATF, also cautioned that this percentage was national and would
be higher in states with no firearms manufacturers, and lower in states like New York and Con-
necticut, with many. Id.
166. The large percentage of firearms included under § 922 (g)(1)'s jurisdiction would cer-
tainly seem to raise a concern about firearms similar to the concern raised about buildings in
Jones, when the Court worried that, given the broad interpretation of the jurisdictional element
of an arson statute, "hardly a building in the land would fall outside the ... statute's domain."
Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. at 848, 857 (2000).
167. See, e.g., Thomas J. Maroney, Fifty Years of Federalization of Criminal Law: Sounding
the Alarm or "Crying Wolf?.," 50 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1317,1370 (2000). See also Jamie S. Gorelick
& Harry Litman, Prosecutorial Discretion and the Federalization Debate, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 967
(1995). The authors, two senior Department of Justice Attorneys, argue that a law making "it a
federal offense to use a gun that had passed in interstate commerce in any crime of violence...
would have federalized ... virtually any crime committed with a gun. The Department opposed
that measure ... [which was] breathtaking in scope." Id. at 974.
168. United States v. Corey, 207 F3d 84, 103-04 (1st Cir. 2000) (stating that the facts in
Corey are unique because Smith and Wesson actually has a factory in Maine, the state of posses-
sion).
169. Id. at 93. This writer was able to find such independent evidence at her local library in
nine minutes. Corey's Smith and Wesson Model 916, slide action, 12-gauge shotgun was manu-
factured in Springfield, Massachusetts. S. P. FJESTAD, BLUE BOOK OF GUN VALUES, 1149, 1185
(21st ed. 2000) (thanking Smith and Wesson historian, Roy Jinks).
170. United States v. Corey, 207 F.3d at 105.
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A second, stated concern of Judge Torruella was that allowing the disputed
prosecution evidence, in "reflexive deference to the ATF," set "a dangerous prece-
dent." 17 1 The questionable evidence was used to prove the jurisdictional element
in particular, the element that federalized Mr. Corey's offense and that "absent
which there is no triable federal crime." 172 The nexus with commerce, once proved,
subjected Mr. Corey's conduct to federal prosecution, where his prosecutors en-
joyed significant advantages in addition to the broad and easily met jurisdictional
element of the statute.
The prosecution had two particularly important advantages once federal juris-
diction was established over Mr. Corey's gun possession. First, subjecting Mr.
Corey's conduct to both state and federal charges gave prosecutors a considerable
advantage in charging him. Like other statutes federalizing a large area of crimi-
nal activity, § 922(g)(1) is broadly written and purposefully over-inclusive. 173 While
the large-scale criminal activity Congress sought to regulate, possession of fire-
arms by dangerous persons, falls under the statute, so does a good deal of "mun-
dane, local" activity. 174 One example of a "mundane, local situation" reached by
§ 922(g)(1) arose in the Eighth Circuit, where a defendant was convicted under §
922(g)(1) and sentenced to fifteen years in prison under § 924(e) after a game
warden found him in possession of a firearm as the defendant returned from duck
hunting. 175 Such federalizing of mundane conduct is expected to be limited, not
through narrow readings of the statutes in the lower courts, but through the exer-
cise of prosecutorial discretion in bringing federal charges. 176 Nonetheless, the
171. Id. at 103.
172. Id. at 93.
173. Maroney, supra note 167, at 1370-71.
174. Id. at 1370 (quoting NORMAN ABRAMS & SARA SUN BEALE, FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS
ENFORCEMENT 79-80 (3d ed. 2000). Federal criminal legislation is frequently overbroad and
follows a recurrent pattern when it is first passed and later interpreted as described in this analy-
sis:
Congress is presented with information suggesting that there is a type of serious
crime problem of sufficient magnitude and occurring on a national scale so as to
warrant federal intervention through the legislating of a new federal crime. Congress
... proceeds to legislate a statute that is drafted in terms that extend more broadly
than the kind of [large-scale] criminal activity that was the perceived reason for the
legislation ....
Subsequently, a prosecution is brought under the new statute, involving a mun-
dane, local situation rather than the type of large-scale criminal activity that was the
perceived national crime problem. Because of the absence of limiting language in the
statute, the prosecution appears to be a permissible invocation of the statute, and the
defendant is convicted. The defendant appeals, claiming that the statute should be
limited to the purposes... delineated in the legislative history. The court upholds the
broad interpretation of the statute consistent with its actual language, concluding that
while the statute was 'primarily' aimed at the indicated large scale criminal activity,
the plain meaning of its express language is controlling.
Id.
175. United States v. Bates, 77 F.3d 1101, 1103 (8th Cir. t996).
176. Maroney, supra note 167, at 1371 (citing Gorelick & Litman, supra note 167, at 973).
The author argues that the decision in Jones represents an attempt by the Court to cut an over-
broad federal criminal statute down to size "by employing a mix of doctrines of statutory con-
struction: lenity, federal-state balance, and avoiding constitutional questions." Id. at 1378.
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easy availability of federal charges gives prosecutors leverage in plea bargaining,
and takes from defendants like Corey the ability to negotiate favorable treatment
in exchange for a guilty plea. 177
The "awesome" and largely unreviewable charging discretion of prosecutors
concerned the American Bar Association's Task Force on the Federalization of
Criminal Law. 178 The Task Force expressed alarm at the power of federal pros-
ecutors and the absence of a principled basis for their "selection of crimes and
defendants from among a very long (and lengthening) list of candidates." 179 Judge
Torruella was correct, though unsuccessful, when he argued that judicial deference
to the prosecution's expert witness was "unwarranted as matter of policy," particu-
larly when evidence was provided by a government agent, was collected after-the-
fact, was self-serving, and where the added disadvantage to the defendant of an
inadequate appellate argument was apparent to all. 180
A second consequence of Mr. Corey's "triable federal offense" under §
922(g)(1) was suggested in Judge Torruella's policy argument, but remained un-
stated. Neither the majority nor the dissent in Corey expressly addressed how
much the defendant had at stake in the outcome of his jurisdictional challenge.
The dramatically different and mandatory sentencing imposed under § 924(e) for
Corey's conviction under § 922(g)(1) fully justifies the urgency and detail of Judge
Torruella's argument for higher standards of admissibility and review of the
prosecution's jurisdictional evidence. 18 1
Authors Gorelick and Litman are senior attorneys from the Justice Department. In a symposium
on federal criminal jurisdiction, they assert:
It is exceedingly difficult to draft a statute in a way that includes only those crimes
that are sophisticated, inter-jurisdictional, or sensitive enough to require a federal
solution. In order to allow sufficient flexibility to bring federal prosecution when an
aspect of a law enforcement problem requires it, federal criminal legislation will in-
evitably have to be overinclusive. It will have to be drafted in a way that includes
criminal activities that state and local criminal justice systems can handle, as well as
activities that they cannot .... The exercise of prosecutorial discretion, then, be-
comes the most important and effective brake on the federalization of crime.
Gorelick & Litman, supra note 167, at 972-73.
177. James E. Hooper, Note, Bright Lines, Dark Deeds: Counting Convictions Under the
Armed Career Criminal Act, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1951, 1959-60 (1991). "Ideally, prosecutors
would exercise their discretion to seek enhanced sentencing in federal court for only a few of
their cases. The threat of prosecution under the ACCA, however, would inspire all potential..
. defendants to agree to [state] guilty pleas with stiffer sentences." Id. at 1960 (footnote omit-
ted). "Congress expected prosecutorial discretion to limit significantly the number of cases
actually prosecuted under the ACCA. Congress envisioned only the more egregious cases as
proper federal fodder." Id. (citing Congressional hearings). See also Brown, supra note 97, at
995-96 (describing how defendants prosecuted for firearms violations under "Project Exile"
were "whipsawed between the two jurisdictions."). Id.
178. TASK FORCE ON THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW, CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, AM. BAR
Ass'N, THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW 31-32 (1998).
179. Id. at 35. See also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995).
180. United States v. Corey, 207 F.3d 84, 93 (1st Cir. 2000).
181. See Gorelick & Litman, supra note 167. The Department of Justice attorneys defend the
allocation of criminal justice resources according to what they call "the comparative advantage
approach," that is, "each agency or level of government ideally should handle those aspects of a
law enforcement problem that it is best equipped to handle." Id. at 976. The attorneys acknowl-
edge that "[t]he availability of stiffer penalties in the federal system is also a potential compara-
tive advantage, particularly in multiple-offender cases, where the prospect of a long sentence
may induce a low-level figure to plead guilty and cooperate in the prosecution of the most
culpable offenders." Id. at 976-77.
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Between 1977, when the Supreme Court set a minimal nexus standard for
felon firearm possession in Scarborough, and Mr. Corey's conviction in 1997,
Congress passed the Armed Career Criminal Act, 182 including § 924(e), imposing
a mandatory minimum sentence on persons convicted under § 922(g)(1) who had
three previous criminal convictions. 183 The Act was intended to punish Violent
repeat offenders who were found by Congress to be responsible for the majority of
crimes involving theft and violence. 184 "By increasing the sentence for career
criminals and by involving the federal law enforcement system, Congress antici-
pated a major reduction in the crime rate." 185
When convicted under § 922(g)(1) for firearm possession, and sentenced un-
der § 924(e), Corey faced a mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen years in prison,
and a fine of up to $25,000.186 The equivalent state conviction in Maine carried a
three- to five-year sentence and a maximum $5,000 fine. 187 Under § 924(e), a
judge sentencing Mr. Corey had no authority to mitigate the sentencing conse-
quences, even if Mr. Corey's possession was a mundane, local offense. 188 In addi-
tion to requiring a fifteen-year minimum sentence,18 9 § 924(e) did not permit the
judge sentencing Mr. Corey to grant him probation or to suspend any part of his
sentence. The statutory requirements for Mr. Corey's past convictions alone iden-
tified him as a career criminal for purposes of § 924(e). A judge was not permitted
to find that, in spite of those convictions or because of the less serious nature of
those convictions, Mr. Corey did not fit the profile of a dangerous career criminal
and should not be subjected to harsh penalties under the statutes. 190 Prosecutors
182. Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2185 (1984). The Act
was part of a larger enactment, The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
473, 98 Stat. 1976 (1984).
183. See supra text accompanying note 4.
184. Congressional hearings relied on a number of studies showing that a small percentage of
criminals committed a disproportionately high percentage of crimes. See Hooper, supra note
177, at 1959-62 (citing studies and Congressional remarks). The act was originally conceived as
a way to help state prosecutors "leverage" guilty pleas with felons while "ildeally, prosecutors
would exercise their discretion to seek enhanced sentencing in federal court for only a few of
their cases." Id. at 1960.
185. Melanie Popper, Note, Retrospective Application of State Firearm Prohibitions Trigger-
ing Enhanced Sentencing Under Federal Law: A Violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause? The
Circuits Split, 27 NEw ENO. J. ON CRIM. & CIv. CONFINEMENT 307,312 (2001) (citations omitted).
See also, Jill C. Rafaloff, Note, The Armed Career Criminal Act: Sentence Enhancement Statute
or New Offense? 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 1085, 1091-98 (1988). Like other statutes that are aimed
at recidivists, § 924(e) has been challenged "as violating due process, double jeopardy, equal
protection, and cruel and unusual punishment provisions of the Constitution, but the Supreme
Court has recognized them as constitutional." Id. at 1094 (citations omitted).
186. 18 U.S.C. § 924 (Supp. 2002).
187. See 17-A M.R.S.A. §§ 393, 1301 (Supp. 2002).
188. In the duck hunter's conviction upheld in the Eighth Circuit, the court noted that "Con-
gress has tied our hands and removed a much-needed measure of judicial discretion through its
enactment of the fifteen year mandatory minimum provision of § 924(e)(1)." United States v.
Bates, 77 F.3d 1101, 1106 (1996).
189. Section 924(e) has no upward limit. A judge may sentence a defendant to life imprison-
ment.
190. Hooper, supra note 177 at 1956-58 (noting how some judges balk at sending a defendant
to jail for fifteen years under § 924(e) when his record leaves serious doubt that he is a career
criminal, while other judges employ "overly mechanical definitions that lead to draconian sen-
tences for... [defendants] who are almost certainly outside the small class of 'career criminals'
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retained a considerable advantage over Mr. Corey given the threat of this dramati-
cally harsher sentencing. Indeed, Mr. Corey's presence at trial might easily have
been the result of his having little or no ability to help himself by pleading guilty. 1
9 1
In spite of the prosecution's advantage, the Corey majority declined the op-
portunity to rigorously review the admissibility of the prosecution's jurisdictional
evidence or raise the standard for admitting such evidence, even where the conse-
quences of federal charges were so grave and the jurisdictional requirements of §
922(g)(1) so easily established. Judge Torruella argued unsuccessfully that the
court, at the very least, should require the prosecution to go beyond government
"internal manuals and post-indictment telephone calls" 192 and provide "direct proof
of interstate nexus" 19 3 where the consequence of finding that nexus was a draco-
nian and mandatory federal sentence.
V. CONCLUSION
Prosecutions under § 922(g)(1) and § 924(e) bring together the minimal nexus
standard of Scarborough with sentencing consequences and reduced judicial dis-
cretion not contemplated by the Supreme Court at the time the low jurisdictional
threshold of § 922(g)(1) was established. However, nothing in the history of §
922(g)(1) suggests that its minimal nexus standard will be altered without an ex-
plicit decision from the Supreme Court, overturning its statutory interpretation in
Scarborough.
Facial constitutional challenges to § 922(g)(1), suggested by the Supreme
Court's holding in a similar firearm possession statute in Lopez, appear to be fore-
closed by the Court's continued preference, established in Bass and restated in
Lopez, for statutes with express jurisdictional elements. "As applied" challenges
to the broad reach of § 922(g)(l)'s minimal nexus will continue to go nowhere, in
spite of the narrowing of a broad jurisdictional element in a federal arson statute in
Jones, as long as Scarborough applies directly in § 922(g)(1) prosecutions and
remains settled law.
Defendants in the lower courts, like Mr. Corey, are left with few avenues for
challenging broad federal jurisdiction under § 922(g)(1). One avenue remaining is
to attack the sufficiency of government nexus evidence, the avenue argued unsuc-
cessfully in Corey. Courts and attorneys seeking to protect defendants from a
deadly combination of a minimal jurisdictional requirement and maximum sen-
tencing consequences, may wish to forcefully take issue with the quality and quan-
which Congress targeted in the ACCA."). The author makes a strong case that Congress did not
envision the routine application of § 924(e), but instead imagined "only the more egregious
cases as proper federal fodder." Id. at 1960. Once convicted in federal court, a defendant like
Mr. Corey can not hope that a judge might find that "the 'mere' fact of three prior felonies,
without more, does not a career criminal make." Id. at 1961 (footnotes omitted) (citing cases
where the federal judge's questioning of the government's proof was understandable in part
because mandatory sentences were so severe).
191. See Dick Thornburgh et al., The Growing Federalization of Criminal Law, 31 N.M. L.
REV. 135, 144-45 (2001) (describing how prosecutors use federal venues to "whack" defendants
with much longer sentences). See also Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 859 (2000) (Stevens,
J., concurring) (citing a twenty-five year difference in state and federal sentences for identical
offenses).
192. United States v. Corey, 207 F.3d 84, 105 (1st Cir. 2000).
193. Id.
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tity of government nexus evidence in those rare instances, as in Corey, where §
922(g)(1)'s minimal nexus is susceptible to doubt.
Finally, the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1)'s jurisdictional element remains
undecided under modem Supreme Court Commerce Clause jurisprudence. Nei-
ther of the cases setting the minimal nexus standard for jurisdiction, Bass or
Scarborough, addressed whether the broad reach of § 922(g)(1) exceeded Congress's
authority to regulate felon gun possession under the Commerce Clause. The Court
has failed to address the constitutionality of the thirty-two-year-old statute even
when its nexus standard does not comport with the "substantial effect on com-
merce" required in Lopez or with Supreme Court jurisdictional standards for newer
statutes in Morrison and Jones. It is reasonable to wonder how long the mere
presence of § 922(g)(1)'s jurisdictional element can continue to immunize the stat-
ute from scrutiny in the present climate of Commerce Clause jurisprudence. 194
Apart from the question of its constitutionality, the jurisdictional language of
§ 922(g)(1) may be vulnerable to a more narrow interpretation by the Supreme
Court in the same way the scope of the federal arson statute was narrowed in Jones
without addressing the statute's constitutionality. A fresh look by the Court at
which felon firearm possessions are meaningfully "in or affecting commerce" could
rewrite the "legal fiction" of Scarborough and raise the minimal nexus standard of
§ 922(g)(1).
As early as 1971, the Supreme Court worried about the unfairness to defen-
dants of reflexively federalizing essentially local felon firearm possessions. 195 The
same unfairness was cited in 2000 by justices concerned with how federal criminal
statutes were displacing policy choices made by states. 196 Given the lethal combi-
nation of high penalties, limited judicial discretion, and a minimal jurisdictional
threshold governing felon firearm regulation, defense counsel and lower courts
may need to vigorously and repeatedly call on the Supreme Court to reexamine the
unfairness to defendants that has evolved since its holding in Scarborough, and to
extend either the heightened standard of nexus with commerce in Lopez and
Morrison, or the narrow interpretive latitude of Jones to felon firearm possessions
prosecuted under § 922(g)(1).
Barbara H. Taylor
194. Weis, supra note 55, at 1454. The author found that not only were lower courts "unduly
influenced" by the presence of the jurisdictional element when determining the constitutionality
of § 922(g)(1) but the reasoning in their opinions was "nonrigorous and unsatisfying." id.
195. United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348-49 (1971).
196. Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. at 859 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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